United Nations S/AC.44/2004/(02)/43

Security Council

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Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)

Note verbale dated 28 October 2004 from the Permanent Mission of Iceland to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

The Permanent Mission of Iceland to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) concerning the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and has the honour to refer to the note verbale dated 21 June 2004, in which information is requested on measures taken, or intended to be taken, by the Government of Iceland to implement the resolution (see annex).

04-59811 (E) 011204

Annex to the note verbale dated 28 October from the Permanent Mission of Iceland to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

ICELAND

National report pursuant to UNSCR 1540 (2004)

It was a truly historic move when the Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 focusing on combating the production, acquisition and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, in particular by non-State actors.

The Resolution decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and shall, in accordance with their national procedures, adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws to this end.

This Resolution also calls upon all States to take collective action to prevent the illegal trafficking and their means of delivery of WMD and related materials.

Iceland would like to express its support and welcomes the adoption of this very comprehensive Resolution on non-proliferation. In our specific situation being a State without national armed forces Iceland has always opposed the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery and strongly supported all international non-proliferation efforts and the role of UN in this field.

Furthermore, Iceland sees this Resolution as an important tool to further enhance and strengthen international cooperation based on existing international law and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of WMD.

Iceland has a number of legislative and executive measures in place to prevent the proliferation of WMD, and regularly reviews these measures as necessary to keep them up to date and in line with international commitments.

One of the main pieces of legislation to prevent proliferation of WMD, including by non-state actors, is the export control law and its accompanying regulations. Work is underway to further strengthen the existing export control regime in Iceland to e.g. include the "Catch-all" clause control in line with the recommendation of the Australian Group. This work is being carried out with representatives from a wide range of ministries and agencies, including the Customs Authorities, who have lead responsibility for preventing the import and export of unlicensed goods, investigating offences and what action to take in case of offenders.

Work will also be undertaken to keep exporters well informed about all relevant export controls in order to ensure they operate within the legal framework.

Furthermore, Iceland is a party to many international Treaties on non-Proliferation, as well as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).

Iceland is also a member of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Australian Group, where prohibitions are enacted in Icelandic law.

At the national level, Iceland has ratified all the twelve international conventions on terrorism and the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism concluded at Strasbourg on 27 January 1977. Furthermore, Iceland has implemented all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions against terrorism, including 1373.

Iceland applauds the global approach by the international community and its comprehensive response using the full set of tools available to governments, i.e. economic, political and diplomatic.

Comments to the specific issues raised posed by UNSCR 1540

Paragraph 1.

Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;

It is the firm policy of the Icelandic Government not to provide any form of support of this kind to non-State actors, which is prohibited under Icelandic law.

Paragraph 2.

Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;

In Iceland, at the national level, necessary steps have been taken to ratify all relevant UN-Conventions and Security Council Resolutions aimed at terrorism, including 1373, that have not already been ratified or implemented. The same applies regarding obligations under CWC and BTWC.

Paragraph 3.

Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their

means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to his end shall:
(a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;
(b)Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;
(c)Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls an law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;
(d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations;

Iceland has established a national licensing system for production, possession, and use of chemicals included in Schedule 1 of the CWC and implementation of reporting requirements for all chemicals included in the Schedules of the CWC.

Iceland fulfills its obligations in respect of nuclear material as one of the member countries of the IAEA.

One of the main objectives of the Icelandic Directorate of Customs is to strengthen control and hinder importation of illegal goods. The Directorate of Customs has the power to require information, examine and take samples for the purpose of verifying customs declaration in relation to goods imported or exported. The Customs, police and coastguard, subject to rights of innocent passage through territorial waters under the Law of the Sea Convention, has the right to stop and search vehicles/vessels on suspicion of carrying prohibited goods.

According to Amendment no. 50/2003 to Act no. 87/1998 on Official Supervision of Financial operation, which was enacted on 7 April 2003, the Financial Supervisory Authority now has the task to implement international obligations by which Iceland is bound, including the Resolutions of the Security Council, concerning financial assets and money transactions. The Financial Supervisory Authority instructs those financial institutions and individuals subject to the above-mentioned Act not to engage in business with listed persons and/or entities and furthermore, they are obliged to prevent by any means such individuals and/or entities from receiving any kind of financial assets.

Paragraph 5
Decides that none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons

Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;

Iceland is a state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and member of IAEA and OPCW.

Paragraph 6

Recognizes the utility in implementing this resolution of effective national control lists and calls upon all Member States, when necessary, to pursue at the earliest opportunity the development of such lists;

Iceland supports a strong and effective multilateral export control regimes. Iceland is a member of the Australian Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and regularly updates its national export control lists. At present there is ongoing work to ensure that the Icelandic export control regimes respond to most recent developments.

Paragraph 8

Calls upon all States:

(a) To promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons;

The aim to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons with promotion of universal adoption and full implementation, and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties is fully supported by Iceland.

(b) To adopt national rules and regulations, where it has not yet been done, to ensure compliance with their commitments under the key multilateral non-proliferation treaties;

When ongoing work has finished, before the end of the year, Iceland will fully comply with commitments under the key multilateral non-proliferation treaties and, at present, no action beyond this is foreseen.

(c) To renew and fulfil their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of non-proliferation and of promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes;

Iceland will continue to fully support the aim of these multilateral cooperation agreements in pursuing and achieving their common objectives, in the area of non-proliferation, and of promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes.

(d) To develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations under such laws;

Iceland is considering what further action might be necessary to establish closer working relationship with exporter and what advice and assistance is needed.

Paragraph 9

Calls upon all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery;

Iceland will promote this dialogue and address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery in a different range of fora.

Paragraph 10

Further to counter that threat, calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials;

Iceland would welcome closer cooperation with other States to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials and are considering what action might be taken.

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Note verbale dated 28 October 2004 from the Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

The Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Chairman of the Committee and, with reference to the latter's note verbale dated 21 June 2004, has the honour to transmit herewith the first report of the Government of Portugal in accordance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) (see annex).

04-59817 (E) 011204

Annex to the note verbale dated 28 October 2004 from the Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)
National report — Portugal

As Portugal is a member of the EU, reference is made to the EU Common Report that will be transmitted to the UNSC 1540 Special Committee separately. This EU Report covers areas of EU and Community competences and activities in relation to UNSC Resolution 1540 and should be read in conjunction with this national report.

This was the first Security Council resolution to address the threat that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery poses to international peace and security.

At national level, we are reviewing our policies, with a view to establishing what further measures may be necessary (appropriate legislation is detailed below).

At european level, Portugal has contributed to establish effective policies within the European Union to prevent WMD proliferation, and will continue to do so.

At international Level Portugal is party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC). Portugal has adopted an Additional Protocol to its IAEA Safeguards Agreement. In addition, Portugal is a member of the following export control regimes: Nuclear Supplier's Group, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangeer Commitee and the Wassenaar Arrangement, and is also a signatory to the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC).

Portugal also helped established the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Comments in relation to the specific items raised by this UNSCR 1540:

Para 1.
Portugal does not provide any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.

According to Law 52/2003 from 22 August (Combating Terrorism) it is an offence to promote or initiate a group, organization or terrorist association, to adhere or support it, to lead a group, organization or terrorist association, to practice

preparatory acts for the constitution of such a group, or for the practice of crimes referred to in this Law; these include acts involving the intention to cause danger through fire, explosion, release of radioactive or toxic gases or substances, research and devices of biological or chemical weapons and use of nuclear energy.

Para 2.
According to artº. 275 of the Portuguese Penal Code (unofficial translation) it is a criminal offence to import, produce, obtain through transformation, stock, buy, sell, cede, acquire in any capacity or by any means, transport, distribute, retain, use or carry any weapon classified as war material, prohibited firearm or to be used to project toxic, asphyxiating, radioactive or corrosive substances; or explosive or radioactive device or substance, as well as when appropriate to the production of toxic or asphyxiating gases, except when within the bounds of the legally established conditions or in conformity with the prescriptions of the competent authorities. Penalties can reach eight years of imprisonment if the device or substance could entail a nuclear explosion.

The Portuguese legislation may be updated, if necessary, to accommodate further measures deemed appropriate in this field.

Para 3.
Portugal applies the rules on non proliferation, export controls and border security as established in the framework of the relevant international treaties and regimes. In cases of dual use items, the specific procedures have been harmonised at the EU level, notably through the Dual Use Regulation (EU) 1334/2000. National legislation applies in all other cases (Decree Law 436/91 of 8 November).

With the aim of promoting cooperation and interaction between several national bodies involved in counterproliferation, a program has been developed; the programme's objectives are: to support control of export and technology transfers, to detect underground procurement networks and to fight nuclear and radioactive smuggling.

Para. 5.
Portugal is party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Portugal is a member of the Organization for the Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons (OPCW) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and presently sits in its Board of Governors.

Para 6.
Portugal is an active member of the multilateral export control regimes, namely of the Nuclear Supplier's Group, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology

Control Regime, the Zangeer Commitee and the Wassenaar Arrangement. In addition to national export control lists, control lists developed under those regimes are also applied by the portuguese export control system.

It is Portugal's policy to encourage non-member states of the export control regimes to adhere to regime guidelines on export controls.

Para. 8.

a) As part of the European Union's action plan to prevent the proliferation of WMD, the EU agreed a Common Position on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of non proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems. Portugal has been carrying out series of demarches to encourage States to conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and to promote the universalisation of the IAEA Additional Protocol (both ratification and adherence to) and the adherence to the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC).

b) Portugal is presently reviewing the status of national rules and regulations to ensure its adequacy to recent developments, including in the field of the CWC.

c) Portugal continues to provide support for the aims and activities of the OPCW, BTWC, and the IAEA.

d) In the framework of industrial cooperation, the Portuguese Government intends to begin and pursue official contacts with private companies operating in this field in order to spread information on the existing rules on the matter and to stress proliferation risks.

Para 9.

In the framework of several international *fora*, Portugal continues to promote dialogue on non proliferation, addressing the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery.

Para 10.

Portugal is participating, from its inception, in the Proliferation Security Initiative, launched in May 2003. Its objective is the interdiction/interception of trafficking of WMD and related material.

The PSI principles are explicitly based on the 1992 UN Security Council Declaration on proliferation of WMD and are consistent with national legislation and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN.

This Initiative has an inclusive nature and is open to all countries that share PSI concerns, principles and objectives (set out in the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, Paris, 4/09/03). Portugal is strongly committed to the PSI goals and principles.

The PSI Fifth Plenary Meeting took place in Lisbon, on March 2004. Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Singapore, Spain, the UK and the US were represented. The Lisbon Plenary addressed several important issues, namely future outreach activities.

In the aftermath of the Lisbon Plenary Meeting, Portugal organized a regional outreach meeting with African countries that took place on the 23rd of March 2004 (Algeria, Angola, Cape Verde, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, S. Tomé and Principe, South Africa, Tunisia and Zimbabwe were present). The meeting had a threefold aim: first, to present the principles and the objectives of PSI and contribute to the efforts to raise worldwide awareness; second, to highlight the important role of the African Continent in the ongoing fight against the proliferation of WMD; and finally, to present the results of the Lisbon Plenary. Several countries expressed an interest to continue to be kept informed on this Initiative.

Portugal favours the review of the SUA Convention (United Nations Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation) so that its law enforcement provisions may also apply to proliferation, as long as it does not interfere substantially with the international maritime trade.

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Note verbale dated 28 October 2004 from the Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), and in reference to the latter's note verbale dated 21 June 2004 and in compliance with the provisions of Security Council 1540 (2004), has the honour to submit herewith the report of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on the implementation of the resolution (see annex).

04-60051 (E) 231104

Annex to the note verbale dated 28 October 2004 from the Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

INDONESIAN NATIONAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540

1. As a victim of acts of terrorism, Indonesia has taken necessary measures to comply with Security Council Resolution 1540, including cooperation with some neighboring countries.

2. It is the national policy and a basic principle that Indonesia does not and will not produce, develop or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Indonesia has always constructively participated in multilateral negotiations to strengthen non-proliferation and achieve disarmament of WMD in all its aspects.

3. Indonesia is fully committed to the maintenance of regional peace and security. In 1971, together with other members of the ASEAN, it declared Southeast Asia as the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality.

Legislative Actions

1. Indonesia ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1978; the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1998; the Biological Weapons Convention in 1991; the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials in1986; the Convention of Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident in 1993; the Treaty of Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in 1997; the Convention of Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident of Radiological Emergency; the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 2001; and is in the process of ratifying the CTBT. Indonesia has also adopted the Code of Conduct and Additional Protocol of the IAEA.

2. Indonesia has enacted:

- Law No. 10/1995 regarding Export Control;
- Law No. 15/2003 regarding the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism.

Executive Actions

1. In order to coordinate and formulate national counter-terrorism policy and strategy, Indonesia established a Counter-Terrorism Coordinating Desk in the Office of the Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs in 2002.

2. Indonesia has established set of regulations to ensure the safe use and control of radiological and nuclear material which include the prevention of theft and sabotage at nuclear facilities:

- Law No. 10/1997 on Nuclear Energy
- Government Regulation No. 64/2000 on Regulation on Nuclear Power Use
- Government Regulation No. 63/2000 on the Safety and Health of Ioniser Radiation Use
- Government Regulation No. 26/2002 on the Safety of Radioactive Materials Transport.

3. With a view to strengthening the effective implementation of domestic regulations, working groups – consisting of various inter-governmental agencies – have been established in the field of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and in counter-terrorism.

Enforcement Actions

1. The Indonesian Nuclear Energy Board (BAPETEN) conducts monitoring/control on the issuance of regulations and permits, carries out inspections, and implements procedure on the nuclear material inventory accounting system. The verification of inventory is managed by routine inspection, which involves the monitoring of the quantity, location and ownership; movement of materials from one installation to another; and export and import of nuclear materials, including waste management. This system detects the release of radioactive and nuclear material, intentionally or accidentally.

2. The government has installed radiation, detection and monitoring devices in major seaports. Detection and monitoring equipments such as X-ray scanners are also located in all main airports.

3. Safety measures in microbiological laboratories are regulated by the Decision of the Department of Health on the Safety in Microbiological Laboratory and Bio-medics.

4. In the case of missing hazardous materials, investigation is conducted by the National Police with the assistance of experts from relevant agencies.

5. The Department of Health has created a rapid response team to overcome emergency situations, such as bio-terrorism attack. In addition, an Early Warning Outbreak Reporting System (EWORS) has been developed.

6. Ministerial Decree No. 254/MPP/Kep/7/2000, regulates the importation and circulation of the chemicals listed in the Chemical Weapons Convention published by the Department of Industry and Trade.

7. Control mechanism on export and import of goods is conducted through:

a. Pre-service control:
Control is conducted through a risk management system. This approach uses an intelligent operation method. In this regard, the target to be controlled is chosen by analyzing the supplier, means of transportation, country of origin and information gathering.

b. Control during service process:
Control is conducted through selective random examination of samples or on Intelligence Notes resulting from analysis of custom documents.

c. Post-service control:
Control of exported or imported goods that are not covered by the pre-service and during service controls, upon preliminary indication of violations of regulations. This control includes post audit of the importer and exporter.

8. Domestic outreach programs to disseminate the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention are conducted regularly and in coordination with the OPCW.

International Cooperation

1. Indonesia has established cooperation with follcwing countries:

d. A Memorandum Of Understanding with the Government of Australia on Combating Terrorism (signed on 7 February 2002).

e. An Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures among the Government of Indonesia, the Government of the Philippines, and the Government of Malaysia to combat terrorism and other transnational crimes (signed on 7 May 2002).

f. A Treaty between Indonesia and the Republic of Korea on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (signed on 30 March 2002).

g. A Bilateral Extradition Treaty with the Administration of Hong Kong (Hong Kong SARC) which stipulates that surrender of the suspect shall be granted for offences related to the law regulating firearms and explosives; piracy involving ships or aircraft; unlawful seizure or exercise of control over an aircraft or other means of transportation; and smuggling.

h. Bilateral Extradition Treaty with Thailand contains crimes punishable for unlawful possession and smuggling or trafficking in firearms, ammunition or explosives.

2. In the framework of regional cooperation (ASEANAPOL), Indonesia conducts joint patrols along the border with Malaysia; it has also established a joint task force with Singapore to carry out maritime patrols.

3. The Work Program to implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crimes (endorsed on 17 May 2002) also involves cooperation to eliminate terrorism, sea piracy, and arms smuggling.

4. Indonesia as an active State Party to the NPT, CWC, CTBT, and BWC has developed close cooperation with international institutions and agencies, such as IAEA, OPCW and the Preparatory Committee of the CTBTO.

5. Indonesia has received OPCW and IAEA inspections.

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Note verbale dated 28 October 2004 from the Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

The Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Chairman of the Committee and, with reference to his note verbale of 21 June 2004, has the honour to forward herewith the report of the Federal Government of Nigeria concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) (see annex).

04-61140 (E) 081204

Annex to the note verbale dated 28 October 2004 from the Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

Report of the Federal Government of Nigeria concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)

Operative Paragraph 1

1. Nigeria does not provide any assistance to any non-State actor to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or their means of delivery. This springs from Nigeria's faithful obligation of relevant international instruments regarding non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

2. Nigeria does not own or possess any nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, nor are there any such weapons located anywhere under her jurisdiction or control; she has not transferred or received, directly or indirectly, any nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Nigeria does not have, and has never had, any nuclear, chemical or biological weapons production facility anywhere under her territory, and has not transferred either directly or indirectly, any equipment for the production of such weapons. She does not have any facility or establishment under her ownership, that has been designed, constructed or used for the development of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.

Operative Paragraph 2

3. Nigeria is a party to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and abides by her obligations under the Treaty. The Treaty has been domesticated as part of Nigerian law. Nigeria has produced a draft legislation on the Chemical Weapons Convention in consultation with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). This is being finalized by the Federal Ministry of Justice preparatory for its consideration by the Senate. Similarly, the draft legislation for the Biological Weapons Convention is being processed. Meanwhile, existing laws of the Federation are being reviewed to bring them in line with the provisions of both the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions.

Operative Paragraph 3 (a), (b) and (d)

4. Nigeria has established an Inter-Ministerial Council for the full implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction as well as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Nigeria has completed a national register on chemical materials imported, produced or consumed in the country and is vigorously pursuing the establishment of a chemical reference laboratory where chemical samples will be tested.

Operative Paragraph 3 (c)

5. Nigeria has established Joint Border Patrol activities with neighbouring States for the purpose of preventing, or detecting, any cross-border transfer of illicit weapons. This collaboration has continued to prove very useful in monitoring illegal activities at the borders relating to weapons.

Operative Paragraph 8

6. Nigeria remains committed to the implementation of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and endorses the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty which will contribute to the promotion of the objectives of the Treaty. As a demonstration of her commitment to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation, Nigeria played an important role in the establishment of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Treaty. Nigeria ratified the Treaty in 2000 and has been unrelenting in her calls on other countries to similarly act to ensure its early entry into force.

7. As part of her efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons globally, Nigeria has also supported the consolidation of the existing nuclear weapon-free zones as well as establishment of new ones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States in the regions concerned.

8. In 2003, Nigeria submitted its latest national report to OPCW in compliance with Article III of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Meanwhile, measures have been taken to sensitize the stakeholders and the general public to the challenges and obligations assumed by Nigeria under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions.

9. Nigeria fulfils her obligations to multilateral cooperation under the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). She has used her membership of IAEA to canvass for and support the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In that connection, Nigeria entered into a Comprehensive Nuclear Safeguards Agreement with the Agency under which any nuclear facility in her possession is subject to IAEA inspection.

Operative Paragraph 9

10. Nigeria has been consistent in promoting dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation as a means of addressing the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery. She has done so in close collaboration with like-minded States on common initiatives within the context of the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations General Assembly. For example, Nigeria joined consensus at the General Assembly in adopting resolutions 57/83 of 22 November 2002 and 58/48 of 8 December 2003 on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. She acted in a similar manner on resolutions in favour of Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions.

Operative Paragraph 10

11. Nigeria has always cooperated with other members of the international community in the fight against illicit acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and is resolved to enhance that cooperation to prevent illicit traffic in these and related weapons.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Abuja
Nigeria

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Letter dated 28 October 2004 from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

Please find attached the report of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as requested in Security Council resolution 1540 (see annex).

(*Signed*) Dirk Jan **van den Berg**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

04-61134 (E) 071204

Annex to the letter dated 28 October 2004 from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

National report of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)

A. Introduction

1. The unanimous adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on 28 April 2004 (UNSCR 1540) was an historic event. This was the first Security Council resolution to address the threat that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, in particular by non-state actors, poses to international peace and security.

2. The Kingdom of the Netherlands has taken a range of legislative and executive measures that ensure compliance with UNSCR 1540. We continuously review our policies, with a view to establishing what further measures may be necessary.

3. The Netherlands is also fully committed to the work of the 1540 in ensuring global implementation of this resolution, including – where appropriate – provision of assistance or advice.

European Union

4. As the Netherlands is a member of the EU, reference is made to the EU Common Report that will be transmitted to the UNSCR 1540 Special Committee separately. This EU report covers areas of EU and Community competencies and activities in relation to UNSCR 1540 and should be read in conjunction with this national report.

Multilateral Treaties

5. Several multilateral treaties seek to achieve objectives that are similar to UNSCR 1540. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is a party to several such international instruments, including:

- 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and under Water (NTBT);
- 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
- 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC);
- 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM);
- 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC);
- 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

In accordance with Article II of the NPT, the Netherlands has concluded a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as an Additional Protocol. The Netherlands has also subscribed to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC).

B. Implementation of UNSCR 1540 in the Kingdom of the Netherlands

1. Operative paragraph 1

Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;

The Kingdom of the Netherlands does not provide any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. To this end, legislation has been enacted and is detailed below.

2. Operative paragraph 2

Decides [...] that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;

2.1 The objective and purpose of UNSCR 1540 converge with those of the NPT, BWC and CWC. The legislation enacted in the Netherlands to implement these Conventions secures compliance by the Netherlands with UNSCR 1540.

2.2 The Biological Weapons Convention (Implementation) Act (*Uitvoeringswet verdrag biologische wapens*) prohibits the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development and transfer of biological weapons (Sections 3-4). The use of biological weapons is prohibited by the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to the creation of hazards (*Wetboek van strafrecht*, Sections 172, 173, 173a, 173b, 287 and 289). The prohibition to posses biological weapons means that the transport of biological weapons is prohibited as well.

2.3 The Chemical Weapons Convention (Implementation) Act (*Uitvoeringswet verdrag chemische wapens*) prohibits the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, transfer and use of chemical weapons (Section 2). The prohibition to posses chemical weapons means that the transport of chemical weapons is prohibited as well.

2.4 In respect of nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Energy Act (*Kernenergiewet*) prohibits the manufacture, possession, development, transport and transfer of nuclear material without a licence (Sections 15, 29). Non-state actors will not be eligible for a licence if issuance thereof would result in a violation of the NPT by the Netherlands. The Nuclear Energy Act also explicitly characterises the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, transport, transfer and use of nuclear material for terrorist purposes as a criminal offence under the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 79). The exposure of human beings, animals, plants and goods to ionising radiation and their contamination with nuclear material is prohibited under the Criminal Code (Section 161).

2.5 With respect to the means of delivery, the Biological Weapons Convention (Implementation) Act (*Uitvoeringswet verdrag biologische wapens*) prohibits the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development and transfer of the means of delivery of biological weapons (Section 4). The Weapons and Ammunition Act (*Wet Wapens en munitie)* prohibits the manufacture, possession and transfer of hazardous substances. This includes

biological and chemical agents and nuclear material (Section 2, category II sub b in combination with sections 9, 14, 26, 27).

2.6 The involvement of non-state actors in activities mentioned in operative paragraph 2 for terrorist purposes is an aggravating circumstance under the Terrorist Crimes Act (*Wet terroristische misdrijven*). The imposition of higher penalties is envisaged if a terrorist purpose is established in case of a violation of the above-mentioned provisions of the Implementing Act of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Implementing Act of the Chemical Weapons Convention (see Section 83 of the Criminal Code in combination with Section 6.4 of the Economic Offences Act) (*Wet op de economische delicten*) or the Nuclear Energy Act (see Section 83 of the Criminal Code in combination with 79 and 80.2 of the Nuclear Energy Act).

2.7 Attempts by non-state actors to engage in any of the activities mentioned in operative paragraph 2 prohibited under the above-mentioned provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention (Implementation) Act, the Chemical Weapons Convention (Implementation) Act or the Nuclear Energy Act, to participate in them as an accomplice, or to assist or to finance them qualify as criminal offences. The relevant provisions can be found in the Criminal Code with respect to attempt (Section 45), participation, subornation and material support (Section 47), complicity (Section 48), participation in a criminal organisation (Sections 140 and 140a) and in the Nuclear Energy Act with respect to conspiracy (Section 80.3).

3. Operative paragraph 3(a)

Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:

a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage and transport;

3.1 The Biological Weapons Convention (Implementation) Act provides the framework for the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and retention of biological agents not justified for peaceful purposes within the meaning of the BWC (Section 2).

3.2 The Chemical Weapons Convention (Implementation) Act provides for an accounting and reporting system in accordance with the CWC (Sections 4-8 in conjunction with the Chemical Weapons Convention (Implementation) Decree (*Uitvoeringsbesluit verdrag chemische wapens*)).

The Strategic Goods (Import and Export) Decree (*In- en uitvoerbesluit strategische goederen)* prohibits the transfer of chemicals on List II of the CWC to States that are not Parties to the CWC; the transfer of chemicals on List III of the CWC to States that are not Parties to the CWC is subject to final destination verification (end-user control).

3.3 The Nuclear Energy Act (*Kernenergiewet*) provides for an accounting and registration system of nuclear material (Sections 13, 14 and 28 in conjunction with the Fissionable Materials and Ores (Registration) Decree (*Besluit registratie splijtstoffen en ertsen*).

4. *Operative paragraph 3(b)*

b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;

4.1 Domestic law requires the physical protection of dangerous goods, including biological agents, chemical agents and nuclear material, during transport and requires transport companies to develop and maintain a security plan. With respect to nuclear material, the Fissionable Materials, Ores and Radioactive Substances (Transport) Decree (*Besluit vervoer splijtstoffen, ertsen en radioactieve stoffen*) secures implementation of the provisions of the CPPNM (Section 4a). Pursuant to this provision, a nuclear security management program must be implemented for every nuclear transport.

4.2 The Nuclear Installations, Fissionable Materials and Ores Decree (*Besluit kerninstallaties, splijtstoffen en ertsen*) provides a framework for requiring physical protection measures in respect of nuclear installations (Section 36.2 in combination with Nuclear Installations Security Guidelines 1993 (*Beveiligingsrichtlijn kerninstallaties 1993*)). These require that every nuclear facility implement a nuclear security management program and submit an annual internal security audit report on what has been done.

5. *Operative paragraph 3(c)*

c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;

5.1 Community customs legislation and provisions adopted at the national level endows customs authorities with powers to undertake actions in general with a view to ensuring that customs rules and, where appropriate, other provisions applicable to goods subject to customs supervision are observed. Customs authorities perform specific acts, such as examining goods, verifying the existence and authenticity of documents, examining the accounts of undertakings and other records, inspecting means of transport, inspecting luggage and other goods carried by or on persons and carrying out official inquiries and other similar acts with a view to ensuring rules and provisions mentioned. The Netherlands has concluded several mutual administrative assistance agreements with her main trading partners. With the aid of these agreements international cooperation with regard to detect and prevent the illicit trafficking.

5.2 In June 2003, the Minister of Finance of the Netherlands decided to install up-to-date technical equipment in the Port of Rotterdam which makes it possible to monitor large numbers of containers for radioactive material. The monitors are used to oversee the flow of incoming and outgoing containers, irrespective of the country of origin or destination.

This decision substantially improves the possibility of detecting and interdicting illicit trafficking in radioactive material. A public tender to purchase and install the necessary technical facilities has been issued. In order to make a quick start possible, in August 2003 the Netherlands and the United States of America signed a mutual Declaration of Principles concerning the installation of special equipment on an interim basis at the Port of Rotterdam to facilitate a quick start. The initial equipment became operational in March 2004. About 90% of all containers passing through the Port of Rotterdam will ultimately be monitored. Dutch customs in the Port of Rotterdam also has two advanced X-ray container scanners.

5.3 To enhance the possibilities to detect, deter and prevent the illicit trafficking and to align all powers to be executed by customs authorities in the case of goods entering the territory of on the Netherlands new customs

legislation will be developed. This will be done in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Netherlands is in the process of establishing a contiguous zone for the purpose of, *inter alia*, carrying out checks at an earlier stage in the logistic chain.

6. Operative paragraph 3(d)

d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and transshipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations;

The Strategic Goods (Import and Export) Decree introduced a system of import, export and transit controls. These include checks on end-users, military materials, including military technology, and dual-use items. EC Dual-Use Export Control Regulation No. 1334/2000 applies to dual-use items whereas national legislation (i.e. the Strategic Goods ((Import and Export)) Decree) provides for additional measures regarding the imposition of penalties for infringements, and gives national authorities powers to carry out controls and to investigate and prosecute criminal offences. Furthermore, the Foreign Financial Relations Act 1994 (*Wet financiële betrekkingen buitenland 1994*) requires a license for financial transactions involving the transit and brokering of war materials.

7. Operative paragraph 4

Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, for a period of no longer than two years, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all members of the Council, which will, calling as appropriate on other expertise, report to the Security Council for its examination, on the implementation of this resolution, and to this end calls upon all States to present a first report no later than six months from the adoption of this resolution to the Committee on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement the resolution.

The Netherlands in its capacity of President of the European Union has promoted the timely submission of national reports of EU-Member States, and has coordinated the joint report on EU and Community competencies and activities in relation to1540.

8. Operative paragraph 5

Decides that none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The Netherlands is a State Party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). The Netherlands is also an active member of the IAEA and OPCW, and is active in the continuing work by States Parties to strengthen implementation of the BWC.

9. Operative paragraph 6

Recognizes the utility in implementing this resolution of effective national control lists and calls upon all Member States, when necessary, to pursue at the earliest opportunity the development of such lists.

9.1 The Netherlands participates in the following multilateral export control regimes, and implements its national export controls in accordance with the guidelines and control lists of the following regimes:

- the Zangger Committee;
- the Nuclear Suppliers Group;
- the Australia Group;
- the Wassenaar Arrangement;
- the Missile Technology Control Regime.

9.2 The Netherlands is a strong supporter of effective multilateral export control regimes and is working to raise international standards.

9.3 The Netherlands is continuing to ensure that the multilateral export control regimes respond to developments in a timely fashion.

10. Operative paragraph 7

Recognizes that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the above provisions.

10.1 The Netherlands recognises that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution.

10.2 In response to specific requests, the Netherlands is prepared to provide assistance as appropriate to States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the provisions of UNSCR 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation.

Requests for assistance should be directed to the head of the Division of Nuclear Affairs and Non-proliferation of the Security Policy Department of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

11. Operative paragraph 8a

Calls upon all States:

a) To promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons;

11.1 The Netherlands is actively lobbying for the universalisation of multilateral treaties whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to which it is a party (see A.5), both through bilateral contacts and in cooperation with the European Union. In this context, the Netherlands has provided funds for and participated in seminars, in the Caribbean and Mediterranean region, to encourage States to become party to the CWC.

11.2 As a member of the European Union, the Netherlands has:

- contributed to the EU Common Position of November 2003 on the universalisation of the main multilateral non-proliferation agreements (CWC, BTWC, NPT);
- participated in EU lobbying for the universalisation of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) and its Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol contains conditions of supply: supported the incorporation of a non-proliferation clause in EU-third country mixed agreements (both political and economic between the EU and third countries). This clause, *inter alia*, codifies commitment to comply with existing obligations as well as to take steps to become party to and comply with other international commitments concerning weapons of mass destruction. In this respect, the Netherlands is working to make the IAEA Additional Protocol a condition of nuclear supply. The Netherlands considers the CSA and the Additional Protocol to be the verification standard;

and in its capacity of President of the European Union, the Netherlands has:

- made EU-demarches for the universalisation of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) and in support of a HCOC resolution to be adopted by the UNGA;
- made a EU-demarche for the universalisation and early entry into force of the CTBT.

11.3 The Netherlands will continue to promote universal adoption and full implementation and, where necessary, to strengthen multilateral treaties designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.

12. Operative paragraph 8b

b) To adopt national rules and regulations, where it has not yet been done, to ensure compliance with their commitments under the key multilateral non-proliferation treaties:

The Netherlands has ensured compliance with its commitments under the non-proliferation treaties to which it is party (see Section A.5) through the adoption of implementing legislation referred to in Section B.2.

13. Operative paragraph 8c

c) To renew and fulfil their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of non-proliferation and of promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes;

13.1 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

The Netherlands and the IAEA have concluded the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its Additional Protocol (See Section A.5). The Netherlands is a regular, voluntary donor to specific activities undertaken by the IAEA to prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials to illicit users. In total, the Netherlands has contributed 550.000 Euro to IAEA.

13.2 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

- As the host country of the OPCW, the Netherlands does everything possible to create an environment in which the organisation and its staff can operate effectively;
- To support the OPCW's important work and, more specifically, the ongoing negotiations on outstanding issues, the Netherlands provides facilitators for several informal open-ended consultations;
- The Netherlands continues to provide support for OPCW activities, i.e. in relation to inspectors' training, national implementation of the CWC and the promotion of the safe, peaceful use of chemistry in States in transition to modern industry;

- In 2004, the Netherlands hosted an OPCW course on Analytical Skills Development for experts from States in transition to modern industry. In 2004, the Netherlands contributed 1.2 million Euro to the OPCW.
- The Netherlands is prepared to make a substantial voluntary contribution to support the implementation of the OPCW Action Plan on National Implementation.

13.3 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)

The Netherlands has sent teams of experts to the BWC meetings in 2003 and 2004 and actively participated in the discussions on the agreed work programme. In doing so, it contributed to the promotion of common understanding and effective action. These discussions will be followed up at the 2006 Review Conference. At present, the Netherlands is funding a study on possible ways to strengthen the BWC in 2006.

The Netherlands will send a team of experts to the BWC Meetings in 2005 to contribute to the discussion on the possible content, promulgation, adoption and enforcement of codes of conduct for scientists.

13.4 The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)

The Netherlands is one of the original parties to the first normative instrument in the field of ballistic missile non-proliferation. The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile proliferation (HCOC) was inaugurated at the international launching conference in The Hague on 25 November 2002.

The Netherlands held the first Chairmanship of the Code in 2002-2003. Both during those years and afterwards, it has made many outreach efforts to increase the number of Subscribing States to the Code, which currently stands at 117.

The Netherlands submits annual declarations on its ballistic missile non-proliferation policies, in accordance with the provisions of the Code.

The Netherlands will continue to support the HCOC and further developments and implementation of the various confidence-building measures set out in the Code.

13.5 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

The Netherlands has been a full, active participant in the PSI ever since its establishment in May 2003.

In cooperation with several PSI partners, the Netherlands has made world-wide demarches to promote the PSI.

The Netherlands attends nearly all PSI interdiction exercises and meetings. At present, the Netherlands is preparing a Dutch PSI interdiction exercise.

14. Operative paragraph 8d

d) To develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations under such laws.

The Dutch non-proliferation policy includes an awareness programme that aims at preventing Dutch companies, universities or research institutions from becoming knowingly or unknowingly involved in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The Dutch government also supports and educates relevant industries on how to comply with their export control obligations and CWC obligations as efficiently and effectively as possible. To this end, the Dutch government disseminates information through government websites, publications and leaflets.

Furthermore, the Netherlands is active in the EU WMD Strategy, also at the national level.

The Netherlands intends to further develop its contacts with industry.

15. Operative paragraph 9

Calls upon all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery.

The Netherlands is a strong supporter of mainstreaming non-proliferation. The Netherlands is working on this in its relations with third countries, as well as between the EU and its international partners.

The Netherlands continues to promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery.

16. Operative paragraph 10

Further to that threat, calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials.

The Netherlands is a full and active participant in the PSI and in the Container Security Initiative (CSI).

(See also Section B.5)